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Taking as a departure point the introduction of expert
systems in the field of administrative adjudication, this
paper aims to present some of the issues and problems
that the law and jurists will face as a result of "new
informational technologies." After an examination of
how these technologies would function in a legal
context, and a short discussion concerning
administrative justice as it is now conceived and
experienced, the impact of computerized administrative
decision-making is examined. The paper assesses the
likely impact of expert systems on administrative
normativity, on the decision-making process, and on
the quality of decisions made. This discussion shows,
among other things, that the conception of expert
systems in law might lead to a major change in the way
jurists understand law and its functions. It also shows
that the introduction of expert systems into
administrative matters carries some major implications
about the way law functions in action.
En prenant comme point de d6part l'utilisation de
syst~mes experts au sein du processus d'adjudication
administrative, cette 6tude vise A prsenter certaines
des probl6matiques que posera au droit et, par
consEquent, aux juristes, l'introduction des nouvelles
technologies de l'information. Apras avoir examin6
comment ces technologies fonctionnent dans un
contexte juridique et discut6 bri~vement l'Etat de la
justice administrative telle qu'elle est vcue, l'impact
d'un processus informatis6 de. prise de d6cisions
administratives est examinE. La question de l'impact
probable de l'utilisation de systbmes experts est alors
abord e tant A lHgard de la normativit6 administrative
elle-m~me, qu'A 'gard du processus de prise de
d6cision et de Ia qualit6 des dcisions. Cette discussion
d6montre, entre autres, que la mise au point de
syst~mes experts juridiques risque de modifier
considrablement la fagon avec laquelle le droit
comprend son fonctionment et, par consquent, celle
par laquelle les juristes anticipent le ph6nom~ne
juridique. Elle d~montre par ailleurs que l'utiliation
de syst~mes experts en mati~re administrative aura un
impact important sur le monde de fonctionnement
effectif du droit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Law does not function in a vacuum. It is indeed very much tied
to the society it is meant to serve. For more than a century now, the
legal system has had to adapt to a series of social and economic
developments. Late in the last century, the law had to manage the new
realities that were the industrialization and the urbanization of
occidental societies. The rules that had developed for an essentially
pre-industrialized civilization were not necessarily adequate to face the
challenges of this evolving context. New rules were developed by the
legal system, and old rules were fine-tuned for the new conditions of the
day. The subsequent emergence of the welfare state also forced a
transformation of the legal order characterized by a re-definition of the
relationship between the law, state, and citizen. From the early 1930s,
and despite any Diceyan rhetoric, an autonomous body of public law has
slowly emerged. The challenge to the evolution of the law was not so
much the transformation of the society, but a changing perception of the
role of law and legal institutions.
The legal system has, over the twentieth century, shown a
remarkable capacity to adapt both to the changing societal conditions
and to the new role attributed to it. Over the last fifteen years, a new
phenomenon which the law has yet to come to terms with has developed.
It is the emergence of a new, technological society which, through recent
scientific and technological developments, has forced a questioning of
many of the beliefs on which society and the legal order are based. Men
can become women, babies can be conceived in laboratories, genes can
be manipulated and modified, and computers can process and
disseminate information as quickly as it is produced. In response to this
new state of things, the law once more has to react and adjust.
But this time around, the law seems to be having some trouble
adjusting. Many of the traditional legal concepts are no longer sufficient
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to effectively deal with the challenges of these new realities. For
instance, the concept of ownership is of little use in resolving issues of
intellectual property relating to software or new biotechnological
techniques. New dimensions must often be added to the strictly legal
ones in order to resolve many of the problems created by these new
technologies-so much so that ethical and moral considerations are now
an accepted part of the new normative order in our societies. The law is
struggling to cope with many of these new realities and, imagination
willing, will probably succeed in regaining a certain form of control over
these new technologies. In fact, it would probably be unbearable to
members of the legal profession if the empire of law shrank on this
occasion.
But there is one further challenge for the law in these trying
days. It is the application of some of these new technologies to the law
and legal order themselves. The question to be asked is the following: if
law is so good at adapting to societal changes and scientific or
technological breakthroughs in other sectors of human activity, will it be
able to do so when the time comes for it to adapt to the tremendously
powerful informational tools that are just around the corner? The
challenge is immediate for the law and all jurists. We are still essentially
functioning as a nineteenth-century profession in the way we
manipulate, use, and produce information. In our occidental legal
systems, we still like to believe that legal rules can only be written. It is
comforting to know that legal decisions can only be made by responsible
individuals, judges, or administrators.
Today, these assumptions must be challenged, and some of the
formidable issues which the law will inevitably face in its adaptation to
the "new informational realities" will be discussed here. For the
purpose of this exercise, I will discuss the introduction of expert systems
into the field of administrative adjudication, and present some of the
kinds of issues and problems these new technologies will present to the
law and to jurists. This should be sufficient to demonstrate the
conceptual and practical difficulties that these technologies will raise and
to indicate the intellectual challenges and sort of questioning each of us
will face. But before doing so, it is necessary to explain what these
technologies are and to say a few words about administrative justice as it
is now conceived and experienced.
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II. LAW AND THE NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
When reference is made to expressions such as "artificial
intelligence" or "expert systems," people usually imagine a world of
robots. In the context of law, we could talk of "Cyberlaw." Some of you
will undoubtedly remember Stanley Kubrick's celebrated film 2001: A
Space Odyssey, in which HAL the computer attempted to take over the
spaceship.1 Of course, we are not there-at least not yet!
Any casual observer will have noticed, however, the rapidly
growing influence of, and corresponding dependence on, computers in
the everyday life of lawyers. Word processing, legal databases, and
on-line research services are all mainstream, if not old, technologies.
The recent appearance of CD-ROMs and, more significantly, the
Internet, will render many of today's technologies obsolete. Information
including legal information will soon be accessible quickly and at costs
which are negligible compared to today's prices. In fact, computers that
are important today will undoubtedly become the most indispensable
research and practice tools. But these developments only constitute the
first few steps in future developments.
Law, it should be remembered, thrives on information. Like
mathematics or philosophy, it is one of the few fields of human activity
that generates its own knowledge without necessarily referring to the
external world. Some of the emerging information technologies that are
the most promising for the law are those associated with data processing
generally, and artificial intelligence and expert systems specifically. The
concept of "artificial intelligence" (Ai) appeared in the 1950s almost
simultaneously with the emergence of computers. Ai can be useful in
fields in which human intelligence constitutes an essential dimension,
such as robotics, expert systems, or the recognition of natural languages,
images, or sounds. In some of these applications, such as robotics, Al
techniques are well-developed and integrated within today's industrial
world. But things are different where expert systems are concerned.
Expert systems are intelligent computerized systems which use
knowledge, as well as inference procedures, in order to simulate
intelligent reasoning and to solve problems in the same way experts in
any given field would do.2 In brief, expert systems in law, for instance,
would reason like an expert jurist and find a solution to the problem it
1 The film was inspired by Arthur C. Clarke's 1953 short story "The Sentinel," reprinted in
A.C. Clarke, Across the Sea of Stars (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959) at 3.
2 P. Harmon & D. King, Erpert Systems (New York: Wiley Press, 1985) at 5.
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has to solve. Specific programming languages (Lisp and PROLOG) that
have very few formal constraints have been developed precisely for that
purpose and are now generally used to conceive and build expert
systems. Since the early 1970s many expert systems have been developed
and this trend has accelerated with the emergence of small and powerful
computers. The technology to build such systems is widely available at
low cost, and there are now few areas of human activity for which expert
systems have not been built. However, and one has to be honest about
this, the development of this technology has not yet produced many truly
impressive systems. The same is true for the legal world where a few
dozen expert systems have been developed and are probably in use
today.3 In Canada, to my knowledge, three expert systems have been
developed (Chomexpert at the Universit6 de Montreal, Nervous Shock
Advisor at the University of British Colunbia, and Logexpert at the
Universit6 du Qu6bec A Montr6al) and none have been commercially or
administratively used.
In fact, the law is generally considered to be one of the most
difficult fields in which to build such expert systems, precisely because of
the generally fluid nature of legal knowledge. While in "hard" sciences a
mineral has or does not have certain properties, or a cell does or does
not react to certain chemicals, in law two jurists will rarely adopt
precisely the same reasoning, even in simple, routine legal cases. That is
to say nothing of complex cases or those where "fuzzy" or
"open-textured" notions are used. For example, what constitutes
"reasonable" behaviour in any given circumstance? How should one
define fairness in a specific case? The generally imprecise nature of the
law is just one of the many difficulties facing any person attempting to
build an expert system. The variety of reasoning available to jurists
(formal logic, deontic logic, predicate logic, rhetoric, etcetera) as well as
the various interpretation rules we use on a continuous basis
(teleological, strict, etcetera), add to the difficulty. The continuing
3 See D. Bourcier, "The expert system BRrMOo and the mArRmoG project" (1989) in I.Th.M.
Snellen, W.B.HJ. van de Donk & J.-P. Baquiast, eds., Expert Systems in Public Administration
(North-Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1989) at 79. For the Norwegian System for
Housing Aid, see J. Bing, "Computer-assisted systems for public administration: Impact on legal
decision processes" in Snellen et aL, ib4 at 113. For Yugoslavia (as it was then known), see M.
Olave, V. Rajkovic & M. Bohanec, "An application for admission in public school systems," ibid. at
145; N. Aucagne et aL, "sEMAPi: An expert system for public administration procurement," ibid. at
161; P. Levine & J.-L. Minel, "A development tool for expert systems in the field- of regulations,"
ibid. at 183; M. Aucoin, B. Micha & D. Pham-Hi, "An expert system for corporate checkup at the
Banque de France," ibid. at 209; K. Vittrup, "EsKoR. A toolbox for VAT auditors," ibid. at 225; P.
Wahlgren, "Social Assistance and Knowledge-Based Systems: PLuTo-A Support System"
(Stockholm: The Swedish Agency for Administrative Development, Statskontoret Report, 1988).
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evolution of the law, which makes it impossible to freeze the state of the
law at any given moment, causes the same problems. One could also
point to the natural languages that support the law, as well as to
temporal logics which are more or less specific to the law, to
demonstrate the incredible complexity of the universe we intuitively deal
with everyday. But the fact that things are immensely complicated does
not mean that they will not succeed. Current cross-disciplinary research
such as that conducted at the Centre de Recherche en Droit Publique of
the Universit6 de Montr6al and in another dozen centres around the
world will lead, if not in the short term, at least in the medium term, to
the elaboration of efficient and real-world size legal expert systems.
In an ideal world, an efficient legal expert system will be able to
provide its user, through simple access, with all the legal advice about an
area of law and about the specific facts at hand. For example, if the area
of law were unemployment insurance, such a system could indicate
whether a person is entitled to unemployment benefits and could ground
its conclusion in statutes, regulations, or the case law. It could also
provide the user with the full texts on which the system has relied and
any contrary reasoning that can be derived from the same facts. In other
words, such a system, in theory, could replace unemployment insurance
agents, even in cases that call for closer examination of the facts (e.g.,
was the departure "voluntary" and has there been "misbehaviour" on the
part of the claimant?). It then becomes easy to perceive the impact such
a system could have if it were used to make decisions concerning
individual cases. This raises the issue of administrative justice.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF CLAIMANTS
All is obviously not well with administrative justice these days. In
this respect, we should avoid perceiving the administrative-adjudicative
world strictly from the somewhat perverse points of view of the litigator,
the student, or the academic. Rather, it should be seen from the
perspective of the claimant, the taxpayer, or the citizen for whom the
minor case is the most important in the world; and from the perspective
of the administration itself, which has to make thousands of decisions
every day, each of them affecting someone's rights.
From the many millions of administrative decisions taken every
year in Canada, one must conclude that a certain number are erroneous,
and that from this number a great majority will never be subsequently
challenged. The scope of this phenomenon is difficult to assess since, by
definition, the figures are almost impossible to gather. However, a
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Royal Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insurance estimated
that in 1986 payments made by mistake accounted for $120 million and
that from this number 20 per cent were explainable by clerical mistakes
and 15 per cent by erroneous decisions of the agents.4 One suspects that
the real figure from the point of view of the claimants would be much
higher. Every mistake identified as such by the administration will lead
to amounts being claimed months, if not years, later from persons
otherwise unable to reimburse these amounts-a process which in turn
leads to further litigation. When there is litigation before administrative
tribunals or in judicial forums, claimants and lawyers have to struggle
with complex statutes and regulations, diverse case law, and directives,
policies, and other non-official norms. On top of all that, the official
laws and norms can change so much on a regular basis that it sometimes
becomes difficult merely to identify which provisions were applicable to
the cause of action. In short, it can be said that in many sectors
administrative justice has today attained a level of chaos unparalleled in
many sectors of the physical universe! New information techniques can
surely help or, at the very least, cannot worsen the actual state of
administrative justice. Of course, if these information systems can help
administrative justice, at least at the initial determination level, they
cannot and must not do so at the expense of the rights of the persons
concerned.
It seems to me that, at the initial determination level, the persons
concerned have two broad categories of rights: the right to be dealt with
under an adequate process, and the right to receive a fundamentally
sound decision. If the initial determination process is adequate, each file
will only be considered by the decision maker on an individual basis to a
minimal extent, and in every case the discretion of the decision-maker
should not be in any way fettered. Moreover, the decision should be
made within a reasonable period of time, since extensive delays in many
instances result in economic hardship for claimants and, as the old
saying goes, justice delayed is justice denied.
If the legal system likes to stress the importance of the process
leading up to a decision, it should not lose sight of the crucial
importance of getting the decision right in the greatest possible number
of cases. In other words, a procedurally correct decision will be of little
help if the decision is legally or factually wrong. It seems to me that the
individual involved is, in every case, entitled to a just and equitable
decision, as well as to an objective application of the legal norms. The
4 Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insurance, Report by C.E. Forget (Ottawa:
Department of Supply and Services, November 1986) at 302.
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decision must, to a certain extent, be foreseeable and as fully reasoned
as possible. Constitutional provisions and social decency also require
that all persons involved be treated equally.
I believe that some of the new information tools can go a long
way towards improving the general quality of administrative decisions
along those lines. It is also my proposition that these new information
tools will force the legal and administrative systems to come to terms
with original questions about the role and the limits of the law and the
legal system.
IV. THE IMPACT OF COMPUTERIZED ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION-MAKING 5
Any discussion about the eventual impact of expert systems on
the rights of the persons involved will necessarily depend on both the
nature of the expert systems and the rights involved. The discussion can,
therefore, only remain general since one can identify many categories of
expert systems and related utilities.6 For the purposes of this discussion,
we can probably speak of expert systems that help to make decisions, or
that make decisions on their own. I have grouped the consequences of
such systems into three categories: those that affect administrative
normativity itself; those that affect the decision-making process; and
those that concern the quality of the decisions made. Let me briefly
describe each of these categories.
A. The Impact on Administrative Nonnativity
I have already mentioned some of the difficulties associated with
mere access to the legal and administrative provisions that are applicable
in any given case. The first result flowing from the introduction of an
administrative expert systems decision-making process would
5 For a more elaborate discussion, see J. Fr6mont, "Les Syst~mes Experts en Matibre
Administrative, les Justiciables et leurs Droits" (1993) in K. Lippel, ed., Nouvelles Pratiques de
Gestion des Litiges en Droit Social et du Travail (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1994) at 143-63,
6 See M. Schauss, "Les Syst~mes Experts en Droit: Quele Aide A la Ddcision?" in M. Schauss,
ed., Systhmes Experts et Drat (Bruxelles: E. Story-Scientia, Pr6cis et Travaux de la Facult6 de Droit
de Namur, no. 6, 1988) at 30; D. Bourcier, "Do la Ragle de Droit A la Base de Rgles: Comment
Mod6liser la D6cision Juridique?" (1993) in C. Thomasset, R. Cot6 & D. Bourcier, eds., Les
Sciences du Tete Juddique: le Droit Saisi par L'Ordinateur (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1993) at 201.
The "textbook model" is discussed in P. Leith, The Computetised Lawyer A Guide to the Use of
Computers in the Legal Profession (London: Springer-Verlag, 1991) at 213.
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undoubtedly be to allow everyone to gain full access to all the relevant
norms (including the case law) that apply in any given case. Such a
process would also allow users to gain access to a level of expertise-that
which is formalized within the system-to which they would normally
not have access.
Another effect of such systems on administrative normativity is
the process of formalizing the norm which will inevitably force a certain
refinement and lead to greater precision with regard to its application.
Fuzzy or open-ended norms will thus become more rigid and be defined
more precisely.7 This refining process carries some obvious difficulties
since it is clear that, in many cases, indeterminate norms are used
precisely because they are indeterminate. In such cases, one must avoid
restricting the application of the norm exclusively to a catalogue of
pre-collected facts.8 Any valid expert system must, on the contrary, be
able to adequately manage all the facts relevant to any given decision.
This, in turn, leads us to question the legal status of the norm
that has been refined through the formalization process. Should the
provisions so formalized be considered as a further "coat" of legal
norms, which would co-exist with the "official" state-defined (by law or
regulation) provisions? If the expert system has any official role to play
within the decision-making process, should this new coat of normativity
receive legislative approval?9 If it does not get such approval, but is
effectively used, does such formalization constitute an illegal delegation
of normative power? Or should the new coat of normativity be
recognized as guidelines and policies which more or less form an
unofficial level of normativity, giving the state the advantage of
bypassing judicial scrutiny? One of the fascinating dimensions of
conceiving formalization in this way is that it could represent an order of
legal normativity existing without any semantic support, being strictly
conceptually and informationally defined.
In questioning the impact of expert systems on administrative
normativity, one must inquire about their influence on the evolutionary
process of the law. Does the decision of the expert system in any
7 See J. Bing, "The Emergence of a New Law of Public Administration" (1990) in H.W.K.
Kaspersen & A. Oskamp, eds., Amongst Friends in Computers and Law: A Collection of Essays in
Remembrance of Guy Vandenberghe (Deventer-Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1990) 229 at 235.
8 See J. Bing, "Three Generations of Computerized Systems for Public Administration and
Some Implications for Legal Decision-Making" (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 219 at 233.
9 See C. Magnusson, "New Roles in the Shaping of the Law" in P. Seipel, ed., From Data
Protection to Knowledge Machines: The Study of Law and Informatics (Deventer-Boston: KIuwer Law
and Taxation, 1990) 135 at 144.
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particular case have value as precedent? If not, why not? If it does, is
there not a danger that in some respects the law could gradually freeze
on any legal question since the system will make identical decisions in
similar cases and each decision will reinforce the system's perception
that the decision is right on a given point?10
These are only some of the effects that the expert systems will
have on administrative normativity. They are not trite. But the
introduction of expert systems will also have some effects upon the
decision-making process itself.
B. The Impact on the Decision-Making Process
It might be at this level, in fact, that the impact of the
introduction of expert systems will be the most widely felt. Expert
systems will allow a rapid and complete integration of the new rules
within the decision-making process which, in turn-and it is not a small
dividend from an administrative point of view-will lead to greater
uniformity in the application of the law. The productivity of the decision
makers will be substantially improved, while their decisions will be more
precise and will not contain errors other than those made by the system.
The costs of processing each file could well be substantially diminished
and the financial losses reduced accordingly. Finally, but not
insignificantly, the time needed to process any file would be substantially
reduced.
Of course, from the perspective of the persons involved, the
perception might be different. However, they could receive almost
immediate answers to their claims and, in many cases, the need to resort
to lawyers to sort things out could be eliminated. When the decision
rendered by the system is negative, it would also be more informative
about the reasons for the refusal and, therefore, what is missing in order
to become positive. In fact, the whole decision-making process would
probably become more efficient, uniform, and predictable. One of the
interesting spin-offs of such systems is that the automatic, initial decision
making would necessarily force a "manual" determination on appeal,
because the system obviously cannot review its own decisions and
produce a different conclusion.
However, one of the effects of automatic adjudication could be
that, in cases where the system is wrong, a mistake is multiplied in a
great number of files. It explains why, from the perspectives of both the
10 See M. Schauss, supra note 6 at 47.
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administration and the individuals, it would be essential to regularly
audit the system to identify such errors as early as possible.l To my
knowledge, no such audit procedures have yet been conceived, as far as
legal systems are concerned. In any case, I would submit that audit
processes would be justifiable in many sectors of the legal world today.
The introduction of legal expert systems will at last force the application
of elements of methodology that are familiar in many sectors, including
environment and accounting, to our legal universe. It should also force
the legal community, as well as the State, to question in a systematic way
how adequately the legal system functions with legal normativity once it
escapes its authors. Finally, it could lead to a more open attitude toward
questioning the approaches related to the statement of legal rules, in
comparison with the effects they produce in action. But the process
might be of secondary importance to the individual; what really counts is
the quality of the decision made.
C. The Impact on the Quality of Decisions
The quality of the decisions that would be generated by, or with,
the aid of expert systems is of crucial importance. Generally speaking, it
is legitimate to think that expert systems will improve the quality of the
decisions made. The future of expert systems will indeed be bleak if they
cannot improve the quality of administrative decisions.
First, expert systems should ensure a more equal treatment
before the law of all persons involved. In other words, all similar cases
will be treated alike, which in turn will guarantee a uniform application
of the law everywhere it applies. In itself, such uniformity would
certainly answer many of the concerns that managers of administrative
systems have when decisions are different from one region to another,
and from one province to another. But the question of whether such
regional administrative subcultures are a good or bad thing must also be
asked. Would the improved uniformity of treatment constitute an
improvement, or would the actual variations not only be acceptable, but
also desirable to a certain extent, for claimants and the equality rights
guaranteed by section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms?12 Although this is probably not the place to answer this
difficult question, it is clear that expert systems will be a very powerful
11 See Bing, supra note 7 at 237; and Bing, supra note 8 at 234.
1 2 Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U..), 1982,
c. 11.
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tool for creating uniformity.
Expert systems will also help improve the quality of
administrative decisions in many cases by forcing the decision maker to
identify and subsequently consider all the facts that are relevant before a
decision is made. The importance of this aspect of decision making is
often underestimated and the decisions resulting from an incomplete
knowledge of facts can often be wrong.13 In most cases, the vast
knowledge base of the expert system will identify all of the relevant
information that it must possess before reaching a decision. Another
spin-off from automatic decision making involving expert systems could
be to force the making of decisions that have better rational foundations.
It is indeed a requirement of the rule of law that administrative decisions
should not be based on arbitrary or irrational foundations. Reality
shows that this sometimes happens, and any properly programmed
expert system will guarantee that decisions are rational and based
exclusively on relevant facts, because it cannot derogate from its own
way of reasoning.
Expert systems should also favour the rendering of decisions that
are justified in light of all the provisions and precedents that have been
used to reach the conclusion. The reasoning adopted by the system will
be transparent and will therefore be easier, if need be, to subsequently
challenge. On this point, any appeal from such a decision will constitute
a "test case" of the expert system, since it will challenge the uniform
understanding which the system has of its own universe.
Of course, the quality of the decisions will also greatly depend on
the level of sophistication of the system itself. A system should, in an
ideal world, be able to not only deal with the rules of its domain of
competence, but also to replicate the use of what can be termed the
"tools of the trade." For instance, the rules of interpretation and
common sense can be considered a lawyer's "tools of the trade." Some
prototypes of systems are now conceived which would allow the
management of diverging, if not conflicting, visions of legal rules in any
given case. 4 But these attempts are especially difficult to conceptualize,
and there is very little consensus in the legal profession as to the exact
13 See R.J. Vernengo, "Decision Forms and Expert Systems in Law" (1991) 4 Ratio Juris 245
at 251.
1 4 See D. Poulin et aL, "Legal Interpretation in Expert Systems" in Proceedings of the Fourth
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (New York: ACM Press, 1993) at 90-99;
and P. St-Vincent, D. Poulin & P. Bratley, "Vagueness, Open Texture and Computational
Dialectics" in Proceedings of the Computational Dialectics Workshop of the Twelfth National
Conference onAn'ficialIntell'gence (Seattle: Washington University, 1994) at 92-102.
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role of the interpretation process and the de facto hierarchies that exist
between the various interpretation rules. The elaboration of expert
systems might help us to gain a better understanding of the role and
limits of the interpretative process as well as the notions of common
sense that are often present in various decision-making processes, but
which do not usually form an official part of this process.
One of the extreme limits of decision making by expert systems is
the exercise of discretion by the expert system. It is one thing to
formalize the functioning of a legal mind with the help of rules and
precedents, but it becomes extremely difficult to teach a computer to
exercise a discretion. (Discretion is defined by the Oxford Companion to
Law as "[t]he faculty of deciding or determining in accordance with
circumstances what seems just, fair, right, equitable, and reasonable in
those circumstances"). 15 However far-fetched it might appear, one
wonders if it would not be technically possible at some point in the
future to replicate such capacities within an expert system. In that case,
one can also ask how such a system could be prevented from exercising
an unfettered jurisdiction, or whether such a power exercised by a
system still amounts to the exercise of discretion.
Fortunately, we still have some .time to think about many of
these difficult questions. The preceding discussion shows, however, that
the introduction of expert systems into administrative decision-making
will have an impact and will raise many issues and difficulties.
Considering these systems to be inherently dangerous is probably overly
alarmist. Expert systems cannot, as HAL attempted to do with the
spaceship, take over the administrative system, precisely because such
information systems are basically stupid-they can only accomplish what
they are told to do. The main dangers associated with the introduction
of these new information technologies at the decision-making level will
flow not from the technologies themselves, but from the use that is made
of them. In this respect, the key to escaping any Orwellian reality is to
be as frank as possible not only about the existence and use of such
systems, but also about the way they are conceived. Full access to these
systems must also be guaranteed to everyone. It is crucial that the logic
of the access to information legislation be extended to these new
informational systems. Openness and subsequent administrative or
judicial control will remain a key to the protection of all those to whom
expert systems would apply.
15 D.M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) at 363.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many of you might be tempted to ask whether it can really be
done, whether expert systems will one day be elaborate enough to
effectively replace humans within the decision-making process. This is
probably the wrong question to ask. You should rather inquire about
when these systems will be conceived and used. Multidisciplinary
research has barely started in the field of law and expert systems, and it
will likely take some time before "mature" expert systems emerge. The
first results show that the realization of expert systems in the legal
domain is made particularly difficult because of the complexity of the
law and its underlying concepts, and because we know very little about
the functioning of the law.1 6 The next few decades will lead to a
fascinating elaboration of the various elements of the law and legal
reasoning. The logic of the law, legal knowledge, legal reasoning, and
the other elements that we use as jurists will be examined for the
purpose of formalization. Many approaches will be put forward, various
understandings attempted. Many will undoubtedly fail. This dimension
of the research leading to the conception of expert systems in the law
might lead to a major change in the way the law, as a discipline, is
understood in its functioning. It is at this level that the impact of the
emerging research on new information technologies will likely be most
important and fascinating.
It will also carry some major implications about the way
law-in-action functions. In administrative matters, the introduction of
these technologies will have a major impact on both the process leading
up to the making of decisions and the quality of the decisions
themselves. It would undoubtedly be a good idea to examine with the
greatest care whether legislative protection is needed in this regard, or
whether the general principles of administrative and constitutional law
are sufficient to guarantee that some of the problems associated with the
introduction of these new technologies will not degenerate. France, the
European Union, and the Council of Europe are already moving in that
direction.1 7
The introduction of expert systems into the law will likely have
16 See R.E. Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1987) at 250.
17 France: Loi No. 78-17 du 6 Janvier 1978 relative a l'informatique, aux fichiers ct aux
libert6s, J.0., 7 January 1978, 227, ss. 2, 3; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Strasbourg, January 28 1981, ILm
1981, at 371ff. (European Treaty Series No. 108).
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an impact on the legal profession by allowing access to everyone
(including the legal profession, of course, but also the general public) to
the system and to the expertise it contains. The legal profession's
monopoly over legal knowledge could finally be broken and this could
force a readjustment of its role. Lawyers' skills will have to extend
beyond simply getting the information and offering a basic manipulation
of that information.
If jumbo jets can in theory fly and land without pilots or
co-pilots, I fail to see why law is so inherently complicated as to prevent
effective automation. Law's empire and lawyers must not be so arrogant
as to think that "it cannot be done." Rather, we should keep an open
mind to the development of tools that are already effective and useful in
many sectors of human activity. Of course, it does remain a very wise
choice to fly jumbo jets with humans in command!

